The All Blacks’ Missing Move: When the Response Doesn't Come

There is an unwritten warning in international rugby. If you beat the All Blacks, you probably didn't want to be the team playing them the following week. A loss tended to sharpen them. Whatever had gone wrong was addressed, standards rose, and the next opponent often discovered why the All Blacks had been so difficult to beat in the first place.
It wasn't an automatic response. There were bad periods, including five consecutive defeats in 1998. But the reputation had a reasonable basis. Looking at Test results since 1996, where the All Blacks played again within 21 days of a defeat, they won 21 of their next 33 Tests through to the end of 2019. Ten resulted in another loss, and two were drawn. Interestingly, that record barely changed between 2020 and 2025. They won 11 of the 17 Tests played within three weeks of a defeat.
Then came 2026. The All Blacks lost three consecutive Tests against South Africa, failing to respond in either of the two immediate opportunities following the first defeat. They subsequently lost to Wales for the first time in 73 years, followed a week later by England's biggest-ever victory over them. Three completed opportunities to respond within 21 days of a defeat this year. Three more losses.
The sample is small, and playing South Africa repeatedly is hardly an easy assignment. But it raises an uncomfortable question about a characteristic once so closely associated with All Blacks rugby. What has happened to their ability to respond?
The response that never arrived
After Wales, Dave Rennie was unusually direct. The All Blacks had let themselves and the country down. The review had been uncomfortable. Players had missed obvious opportunities, become tunnel-visioned and failed to make decisions that should have been straightforward. He identified examples where the right option appeared available but wasn't taken: six-on-twos, five-on-twos, and players running into contact when a simple pass would have created space.
The explanation wasn't a lack of effort. Rennie believed the pressure had affected the players' ability to see what was happening. By the time the England team was named, the message was clear. They had reviewed the problems, understood what needed to change and prepared well. Will Jordan described one of the lessons as keeping their vision open when pressure came on, continuing to see the field and trusting their systems.
There were plenty of reasons to expect a response. Beauden Barrett was playing his 150th Test, Anton Lienert-Brown his 100th. Several established players returned to the side. England were a formidable opponent, but beating them would also provide a chance to reach the Nations Championship final. The disappointment from Wales was still fresh. Nobody needed reminding what the match meant.
Then England beat them 37–12. And this wasn't another narrow defeat in which the All Blacks created opportunities but couldn't quite finish them. England dominated possession and territory. The All Blacks struggled to retain the ball, establish continuity or put any sustained pressure on the opposition.
Rennie's assessment afterwards was that they were "miles off”. He believed the preparation had been good. There had been plenty of motivation. England hadn't surprised them. They knew what was coming but couldn't deal with it. Codie Taylor said the messages on the field were clear, and the players were engaged in their huddles. But every attempt to regain control seemed to end with another mistake or turnover. He described it as a vicious cycle.
There is something particularly revealing about that sequence. The team understood what went wrong against Wales. It could describe the response required against England. The players were motivated, the preparation was considered good, and the leadership was experienced. Yet the performance deteriorated. That suggests we need to look beyond the usual explanations.
Knowing what to do is not the same as doing it
Against South Africa, the All Blacks created enough opportunities to compete but struggled to sustain pressure and make those opportunities count. Against Wales, they had possession and territory but repeatedly returned to attacking responses that weren't producing results. Against England, they couldn't establish enough continuity to create sustained pressure in the first place.
These performances weren’t identical, and it would be a mistake to assume a single psychological problem explains every technical failure. South Africa and England were excellent opponents, while Wales produced an extraordinary defensive effort. But across the three, a recurring difficulty emerges. The All Blacks appear increasingly unable to produce the collective response required when the opposition disrupts what they are trying to do. And this is where experience becomes an interesting part of the problem.
The Wales side wasn't short of experienced All Blacks. Beauden Barrett, Scott Barrett and Anton Lienert-Brown alone had more than 330 Tests between them. These players have encountered nearly every form of pressure international rugby can produce. They understand the game. They know what a numerical advantage looks like, when a penalty goal can change the scoreboard and why continually running into a well-organised defence might not be the best option.
Yet experience did not prevent their collective decision-making from deteriorating. Against England, even more established players were back, but the performance was worse. Perhaps the problem isn't a lack of experience. It is what happens to the way that experience gets used when pressure increases.
One idea behind The Missing Move is that people can become trapped by responses that have worked extremely well for them in the past. The response still makes sense. It feels familiar, often produces something useful and has probably contributed to their success. But when circumstances change, the same response may no longer produce what they need. And the more important the outcome becomes, the harder it can be to recognise that something different is required.
That is one possible explanation for what we're seeing. Against Wales, the All Blacks appeared to become increasingly committed to forcing a result through repeated carries. Against England, mistakes and turnovers kept feeding the opposition's pressure, making it harder to establish their own game. Different circumstances, but in both cases the group struggled to interrupt a pattern that was taking it further away from the result it wanted.
What does a good review actually change?
This is the part of the current situation I find most difficult to reconcile. Throughout the South Africa tour, Rennie repeatedly talked about reviewing, learning and preparing for the next challenge. The language has remained remarkably consistent. Stay present. Do your job. Trust the preparation. Play what is in front of you. Learn and improve. There is plenty to like in those principles.
But after Wales, Rennie could describe the missed opportunities in considerable detail. He knew the players had become tunnel-visioned. He understood the importance of keeping their vision open under pressure. The players understood it too. Then they went into England and produced a performance that, by Rennie's own assessment, was considerably worse.
We cannot know from press conferences exactly what was practised during the week or what was happening in the players' minds. But we can see that the preparation did not produce the required performance. And at some point, that has to become part of the review itself. The question is not simply whether the players understood the lessons. It is whether the preparation developed their ability to respond differently when those lessons were tested.
That distinction matters in any high-performance environment. A group can be excellent at identifying problems, discussing them openly and agreeing on what needs to improve. Everyone can leave the meeting with a clear understanding of what good looks like. But if the same response keeps appearing under pressure, the learning hasn't yet translated into the capability the group needs. Being able to describe a better response is not the same as being able to produce it.
The environment is now being tested
Earlier this year, I wrote about how Rennie appeared to have changed the environment around essentially the same group of players. The evidence was encouraging. More freedom, greater optimism, healthier competition for places and a stronger sense that players were valued even when they weren't selected. Those changes remain worth recognising.
And Rennie has continued to demonstrate some important leadership qualities as the results have deteriorated. He has accepted responsibility, defended the quality of his people and resisted turning individual mistakes into personal failures. Following England, he was asked whether the defeats made him question the players and coaches around him.
He said he had no doubt their quality. That may be entirely fair. Good players and good coaches can produce poor results without suddenly becoming bad at their jobs. But there is a possible trap in that confidence. If the people are excellent, the environment is strong, preparation is good, and everyone understands the game plan, then each defeat can become another discussion about execution.
The All Blacks didn't do what they were capable of doing. That may describe the performance accurately. It doesn't necessarily explain why the failure keeps happening. At what point does repeated failure to execute become evidence that something in the performance system needs to change? It is a question worth asking because creating an environment where people want to perform and developing the ability to make effective decisions under pressure are not necessarily the same thing.
Connection, trust and motivation all matter. But they do not automatically prevent people from becoming tunnel-visioned, reverting to familiar responses or losing the ability to work together when the situation becomes difficult. Those capabilities have to be developed and maintained as well.
The missing move may now belong to the coaching group
After South Africa, I suggested three missing moves for the All Blacks: commitment, receptivity and balance. Stay with what is working. Let the situation tell you what it needs. Stop trying to win the whole Test in the next moment. Wales provided further evidence of the need for those responses. England has now extended the question to the coaching group itself.
Rennie has good reasons to trust the environment he has created. It has produced meaningful changes. The players appear connected, competition for places is strong, and there have been periods of very good rugby. But the results are increasingly asking something more of that environment.
- Commitment means retaining the strengths that remain valuable without becoming committed to every assumption about how they should work.
- Receptivity means being prepared to examine whether the current preparation is developing the capabilities needed, rather than simply asking players to execute the same approach more accurately.
- Balance means acknowledging the significance of the defeats without allowing the need to produce an immediate response to become another source of pressure that interferes with performance.
None of that requires another reinvention. Nor does it mean abandoning the freedom and trust Rennie has worked to establish. It means recognising that the problem may now be different from the one he inherited. And that is the uncomfortable lesson from the England defeat. Historically, the All Blacks could often turn a poor performance into a markedly better one the following week. The statistics suggest that ability remained reasonably intact until recently.
This year, the immediate responses have not come. The players are still experienced. They still care. The coaching group still believes in them. They can explain what has gone wrong, often with considerable accuracy. But understanding a problem and changing the behaviour that produces it remain two different things. The All Blacks haven't necessarily lost the desire to respond. What they appear to be missing is a reliable way of turning that desire into a different performance.
And until that changes, another difficult review and another good week of preparation may lead to another explanation of why the response never arrived.