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The All Blacks’ Missing Move

The All Blacks became freer, more optimistic and more dangerous under Dave Rennie. South Africa showed the three further moves the team still needed.

All Blacks player beneath the words Commitment, Receptivity, Balance

The All Blacks got better on this tour. They also lost the series 3–1 - both matter. Plenty of evidence shows Dave Rennie has changed the team's environment. The players look freer. They play with more optimism. Selection has generally been explained rather than allowed to become a judgement on the person. Players outside the match-day 23 have remained involved. Competition for places is obvious, but it has not turned teammates into threats. Mistakes are reviewed without immediately becoming evidence that somebody no longer belongs.

The language has been unusually consistent too. Be where your feet are. Do your job. Play what is in front of you. Trust the preparation. Enjoy the moment. Earn the right. None of that proves the culture is good, but the same ideas have kept appearing in selection decisions, training, player interviews and eventually in the way the team plays. Something has changed. South Africa made it clear what has not changed enough.

One of the ideas behind The Missing Move is that a strength can keep making perfect sense even after it stops giving us what we need. That is what makes it difficult to question. The behaviour may still be useful; the problem is that doing it more no longer produces the same result. The answer is often not to abandon the strength, but to add another response alongside it. That is a useful way to understand where these All Blacks have arrived.

Earlier this year Gilbert Enoka described the environment as a multiplier. Rennie has not discovered a new group of rugby players. Much of the talent was already there. What has changed is the environment around it and, with that, the behaviours players are more willing to use.

Mike Blair has described an attacking framework with “freedom within that”. Players are expected to use their judgement rather than wait for every answer to come from the coaches. They are encouraged to play what they see. Against probably the best defensive side in world rugby, that freedom produced something tangible. Before the fourth Test, Blair pointed to 13 tries in the first three Tests and 12 line breaks in the third. South Africa were not simply squeezing the All Blacks until they ran out of ideas. The All Blacks could open them up.

That matters because three consecutive losses can easily push a team toward the wrong correction: become more conservative, take away some freedom, kick more, and reduce the decisions players have to make. The evidence from these Tests does not really support that. The All Blacks created enough opportunities to win. What happened around those opportunities was the bigger problem.

The selection decisions tell a similar story. Richie Mo’unga started the final Test, but Rennie made it clear that decision had been made weeks earlier and would have happened whether the All Blacks were 2–1 up or 2–1 down. Ruben Love had not suddenly failed. Rennie reminded him that only a week earlier he had been trusted to start what Rennie described as probably the biggest All Blacks Test since the World Cup final, ahead of three more experienced first-fives.

Beauden Barrett spent long periods outside the starting side and still made an important contribution in meetings, training and leadership. Players competing for the same positions were helping one another improve. Rennie summed that up neatly before the final Test: for the All Blacks to win, they needed everyone going well.

The same principles held when they became inconvenient. Players were not rushed back simply because a series was on the line. Selection continued to be based on readiness, role and performance rather than reputation or panic. Culture becomes more believable when following it costs you something. There is plenty to like in all of that. The danger is treating it as the finished job.

Rennie has done a very good job changing the environment. That is not the same as having built a team capable of regularly beating the best side in the world. The All Blacks didn't spend six weeks together to prove their culture had improved. They went there to win Tests. They won one of four.

“Small margins” came up repeatedly after the losses. The description was fair. Ellis Park was much closer than the final score suggested. Cape Town was tight. The All Blacks had South Africa under pressure for long periods in Soweto. The final Test remained competitive well into the second half. No enormous gulf separated these teams. But after four Tests, small margins stop being much of an explanation. At this level, the small margins are the game. South Africa were better at them.

Neil Barnes put it more directly after the third Test. The statistics might say the teams were close, but “we’re coming second to this crew”. He also said they had built well enough to have a chance to be part of history and had failed. That is probably the more useful diagnosis.

The All Blacks are better. They also lost three Tests in a row, and by the end several of the things costing them were no longer new problems. Discipline had been discussed repeatedly. The aerial contest had been discussed repeatedly. Their restarts had been identified. They knew what happened when they gave South Africa set-piece opportunities. They knew turnovers killed their continuity and fed South Africa’s strengths. They were also creating opportunities they failed to finish. At some point, being able to describe a problem stops being evidence that you are learning. The next behaviour has to change.

South Africa also exposed something more uncomfortable: there is not one remaining weakness to fix. Different things hurt the All Blacks at different times. Earlier on tour, the scrum caused serious problems. The lineout had difficult periods. The aerial contest kept putting them under pressure. Discipline kept returning. At other times, they created enough opportunities but didn't convert enough. They also had periods where the game looked exactly how they wanted it to, but they couldn't maintain enough control for it to count.

If one obvious weakness had cost them three Tests, the solution would be relatively simple. Fix it. Instead, South Africa kept finding different places to apply pressure. The All Blacks were good enough to stay with them and good enough to hurt them, but not yet reliable enough across enough parts of the game to beat them regularly.

At Ellis Park, the All Blacks showed what it looks like when everything holds together. They came under serious pressure, stayed composed and eventually pulled away. Ardie Savea described the critical period afterwards in very ordinary terms: they stayed present, and everyone did their job. There was nothing especially romantic about it. The environment did not remove the pressure. It helped them respond well enough while they were in it.

The next three Tests showed how difficult it is to repeat that against a side like South Africa. The All Blacks kept creating enough to remain dangerous, but too often found themselves on the wrong side of the moments that mattered. At times South Africa's set piece changed the game. Other times it was field position, the aerial contest, or discipline. There were also periods when the All Blacks had created enough pressure themselves but could not sustain it.

South Africa did not need the same route every week. The All Blacks became good at creating moments. South Africa were better at owning them. That was not bad luck. Across four Tests, it was the decisive performance difference between the teams.

Codie Taylor said much the same thing after the final Test. In the first match, the All Blacks created and stacked enough positive moments. In the following three, they fell short in crucial ones, and South Africa punished them. That is how a series finishes 3–1 without one team being vastly superior.

South Africa did not have to dominate every part of every Test. They could hurt the All Blacks at set piece, put them under pressure in the air and punish them when they were given field position. When the game opened up, they showed they could play there too.

The All Blacks can compete with South Africa. This series established that. It did not establish that they can do it consistently enough, across enough different versions of a Test, to expect to beat them regularly.

The answer should not be another reinvention. The strengths Rennie has restored are worth keeping. Optimism matters. So does freedom. Trusting what they see rather than waiting for instructions has made the players more dangerous. The work around connection, contribution and competition looks valuable too. But strengths can create their own problems.

Seeing possibility encourages players to keep looking for what else might be available. Being trusted to shape what happens encourages them to act on what they see. Wearing an All Blacks jersey brings its own expectation that the opportunity should be made to count. At their best, those three things fit together beautifully. See the opportunity. Back the judgement. Deliver the result. Under pressure, they can also start feeding one another. Another possibility appears. A strong sense that something can be done emerges. The next action begins carrying more of the expectation to make something happen. That is where the missing moves become surprisingly coherent.

Commitment. Receptivity. Balance.

In rugby language, they are simpler than that.

Stay with what is working. Let the situation tell you what it needs. Stop trying to win the whole Test in the next moment.

Commitment here is about staying with what is working long enough for it to produce a result. Blair came close to describing this before the final Test when he talked about maintaining pressure through multiple phases rather than letting an opportunity that did not immediately produce a try end in a turnover. The All Blacks do not always need another option. Sometimes what is already working needs more time.

Receptivity is about recognising when the game is narrowing your choices. Having licence to shape what happens does not mean every situation needs shaping. Sometimes the opposition, the referee, the field position or the players around you are already telling you what is required. The useful response may be much more ordinary than the one you first saw.

Balance matters because not every moment has to carry the weight of the result. The desire to make the difference comes with the jersey, but a disappointing moment does not always need to be repaired immediately by producing something exceptional in the next one. Good Test teams can let one moment finish and play the next one for what it actually is.

That is probably what control means for this team. It is not about becoming conservative or taking the game back from the players. It is about knowing what the moment now requires. There will be times to move the ball quickly and others when another phase is enough. There will be times to attack the space and others when keeping the opposition defending is more valuable. There will also be periods when the obvious thing simply needs to be done well.

And after something good happens, bank it. Maintain the pressure, take the territory you have, protect possession, and stay disciplined. Make South Africa create its own way back into the game instead of giving it to them. None of that is less ambitious than expansive rugby. Against South Africa, that may be what makes expansive rugby matter.

Rennie says the All Blacks left the tour in a better place than when they arrived. There is good reason to believe him. They look more connected, the squad is deeper, and the game plan is clearer. More players now have meaningful experience against the best team in the world, competition for places looks healthy, and they have shown they can create enough opportunities to trouble South Africa. All of that is progress.

Anton Lienert-Brown put the necessary qualification on it before the final Test: “We’ve got to put results on the board. The last two haven’t been what the jersey requires.” They then lost again. A better environment is not the result. It is meant to help produce the result. Rennie has changed the environment faster than he has changed the team’s ability to finish what that environment makes possible. He deserves considerable credit for the first part. That does not make the second any less important.

The problem now looks different from the one the All Blacks had a few months ago. They no longer look like a team trying to work out what they want to be. They have found some genuine strengths. South Africa showed them where those strengths fall short. They did it in different ways across four Tests, often just when the All Blacks looked close enough to win.

A gap remains between being capable of beating South Africa and being able to do it regularly. Closing it does not require the All Blacks to become a different team. It requires commitment, receptivity and balance alongside the strengths Rennie has already restored. They need another move.